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ABSTRACT
We consider a Cournot equilibrium where firms with identical cost
functions produce a homogeneous good. A subset of these firms faces an
exogenously-induced marginal contraction of individual output. We show that
for any given finite number of firms greater than one, each firm in the subset
will gain (lose) if the number of firms in the subset is sufficiently large
(small). With constant marginal costs of production and a linear inverse
demand curve, the firms in the subset will gain if and only if they outnumber
the firms outside it by more than one. In general, the firms in the subset
will gain if and only if their number exceeds by more than one an "adjusted"
number of outside firms, where the multiplicative adjustment factor depends on
the curvatures of the cost and inverse demand curves. In a price-taking
equilibrium, on the other hand, the firms in the subset will never lose from a
marginal contraction of their output. Indeed, they will strictly gain if
marginal cost is strictly increasing. These local results are used to extend
the analysis to the effect on profit of exogenously-induced non-marginal
changes in output.
These fundamental comparative-static properties have implications for
the relationship of Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria. We show how they can
be used to generalize some standard duopoly results on first-mover advantage
to the case of N-player sequential-move oligopoly games. We also show how
these properties of the Cournot model apply directly to the analysis of
certain strike situations and underlie the results in the applied literature
on gains from export subsidies and on losses from horizontal mergers.
Finally, we discuss how the results may be generalized to various
assumptions about substitutability and complementarity and to strategic
variables other than quantity.
I. Introduction
Consider an industry composed of N firms with identical
cost functions. The Cournot equilibrium is displaced by an
exogenously-induced marginal contraction of the output of a
subset of these firms. Do profits of the firms in this designated
subset increase or decrease as a result?
Readers whose point of reference is Cournot duopoly know
that a marginal contraction of the output of a single firm in the
neighborhood of the Cournot equilibrium will decrease its profits.
On the other hand, readers whose reference point is monopoly know
that when an N-firm industry is monopolized, a marginal contrac-
tion of the output of each "plant" will be profitable. Evidently,
the answer to our question depends on the size of the designated
subset relative to the size of the industry. It turns out also to
depend on the curvature of the demand and cost functions.
In this paper, we answer the question posed at the outset
and provide the underlying intuition. A marginal contraction is
strictly beneficial (strictly harmful) if and only if the number
of firms in the designated subset exceeds the "adjusted" number of
firms outside it by strictly more (strictly less) than one. The
adjustment factor is unity when cost and demand functions are
linear but, more generally, depends on the convexity of the cost
and demand curves. For example, a marginal contraction of two
firms in a triopoly has no effect on the profits of firms in the
subset if cost and demand functions are linear; if instead cost is
linear but the demand function is strictly concave (strictly
2
convex), a marginal contraction will strictly decrease (strictly
increase) profits.
These results can be easily understood if they are viewed
from the following perspective. Since, in the neighborhood of
equilibrium, a marginal contraction in the output of any firm
would have no effect on its profits (in the absence of other
changes), the profit of a firm in the subset will increase in the
new equilibrium if and only if the aggregate output of the other
N-1 firms decreases. Such a decrease will occur if and only if
the exogenous marginal contraction of all the other firms in the
subset exceeds the induced expansion of the firms outside the
subset. This perspective not only provides a precise explanation
of the comparative statics results under Cournot competition
mentioned above but also facilitates extension of these results to
other forms of competition (e.g. Bertrand competition and price-
taking behavior) and to situations where goods are either
complements in demand or, alternatively, strategic complements.
These comparative-static results have many applications.
We show, for example, that they underlie 1) the observations of
Carter, Hueth, Mamer, and Schmitz (1981) (among others) that
strikes may benefit struck firms; 2) the results in the strategic-
trade literature, originating with Brander and Spencer (1985),
that export subsidies may increase profits even if the subsidy
receipts are taxed away from the export sector in a lump-sum; and
3) the results in the horizontal mergers (and cartel) literature
originating with Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) that some
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mergers (or some cartelizations) may be unprofitable. In each of
these cases, outputs of a designated subset of firms contract or
expand as a result of some exogenous change, other firms best-
reply, and the focus is on how profits of firms in the designated
subset are affected.
More fundamentally, these comparative-static results have
implications for the relationship of the strategic variables in
simultaneous-move and sequential-move oligopoly games. In the
case of quantity competition, for example, suppose a Stackelberg
leader took over the operation of a subset of firms which were
previously operated independently as part of a symmetric N-firm
Cournot equilibrium. The conditions we derive indicate whether
that leader would increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the
output of each technology under his control. Contrary to the
familiar but extreme case of duopoly, therefore, the Stackelberg
leader may wish to contract outputs relative to their Cournot
levels when he operates more than one technology. In such
situations, standard results on first-mover advantage in quantity
games, which have been derived assuming duopoly, are reversed. As
before, our comparative-static results also have implications for
Stackelberg games under other forms of competition (e.g. Bertrand
competition or price-taking behavior by followers) and other
assumptions about substitutability in demand or strategic
substitutability.
The generalizations of the comparative-static results to
market structures other than Cournot oligopoly also have important
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applications. For example, the generalization to Bertrand
competition indicates how price ceilings or price floors imposed
on a subset of firms in an industry will affect their profits when
firms compete in price.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
section II, the comparative-static properties of the Cournot and
price-taking equilibria are derived. In section III, these
results are applied to the cases of strikes, horizontal mergers,
and export subsidies. In section IV we conclude the paper by
discussing the generalization of our results under alternative
sets of assumptions.
II. The Effect of an Exogenous Output Contraction
A. Marginal Changes
Consider an industry composed of N firms producing a
homogeneous good with identical cost functions. Each firm in a
subset S i N is assumed to be exogenously induced to produce an
identical output q > 0. The output of each of the other firms is
unconstrained. We will denote it q. Total industry output is
then given by:
Q = Sq + (N-S)q (1)
The inverse market demand is given by p(Q). It is assumed there
is a QO > 0 such that p(Q) > 0 for Q < QO and p(Q) = 0 for Q Q0
and that p(Q) is twice continuously differentiable with p' (Q) ( 0
for Q ( QO. The typical firm's cost of production is C(q), with
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C(q) > 0 if q > 0 and C(0) = 0. It is assumed to possess continu-
ous first and second derivatives, which satisfy C' > 0 and
C" 0.
We further assume that p' (Q) + qp"(Q) < 0 for all
q i Q i Q°.1 Thus a given firm's marginal revenue must fall when
any rival firm increases its output. In addition to being
substitutes in demand the goods are therefore also strategic
substitutes: each firm's best-reply function is downward sloping. 2
The firms select their output simultaneously in a one-
stage game. Hence, in a Nash equilibrium, the output of each firm
maximizes its profits given the output of the N-i other firms.
However, each of the S firms in the subset is assumed to be
constrained to the level of output 4, which may or may not differ
from q. Thus the Cournot equilibrium will satisfy the following
set of equations: 3
p + qp' - C' (q) = 0 (2)
p + 4p' - C' (4) =p (3)
p = p(S4 + (N-S)q) (4)
Equation (2) is the first-order condition for profit maximization
of the typical unconstrained firm and equation (3) is that of the
typical constrained firm. The variable p is the shadow cost of
the output constraint to the typical constrained firm. Whenever
4 x q, then p - 0 and the constraint displaces the Cournot
equilibrium; whenever 4 = q, then y~ = 0 and the constraint does
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not displace the equilibrium. We will refer to this latter
situation as the "unconstrained Cournot equilibrium".4
The equilibrium profits of each firm will be a function of
4, N and S. In particular, the profit of a typical firm in the
subset of constrained firms is:
ffs(q,N,S) = p(Sq + (N-S)q)4 - C(4) (5)
where q = q(4,N,S) is the equilibrium output of the unconstrained
firm, obtained by solving (2), (3) and (4) for (p,q,p).
Differentiating (5) with respect to 4 and making use of
(3), we get:
Ts = p + [(s-1) + (N-S)Vp' 4 (6)
The first term represents the effect on the profit of the typical
firm in the subset of a marginal variation in q if the output of
the N-1 other firms were to remain unchanged. The second term
captures the effect attributable to the change in the equilibrium
output of the N-i other firms induced by the change in q. Recall
that at an unconstrained Cournot equilibrium, 4q= q and p = 0.
Hence, the effect on the profit of the typical firm in the subset
of a marginal variation of its own output, holding constant the
outputs of all the other firms, is negligible. 5 As a result,
equation (6) implies that:
s L1~ 1 0 iff (s-i) + (N-S) ]0 (7)
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The term in brackets in (7) is simply the derivative with respect
to 4 of the aggregate output of the N-1 other firms, S-1 of which
are in the subset and N-S of which are outside it. It follows
that a marginal change (an increase or decrease) in 4, in the
neighborhood of the unconstrained equilibrium, will raise the
profit of each firm in the subset if and only if the equilibrium
aggregate output of the N-1 other firms declines as a
consequence.6
To investigate ars/a4 in more detail, we need an explicit
expression for aq/a4. By total differentiation of the equilibrium
conditions (2), (3) and (4) and application of Cramer's rule (see
Appendix A), we get:
- -[p'+ qp"]S < 0 
(8)84 A
where A = (N-S)[p'+ qp"] + p'- C" < 0. Not surprisingly, a
marginal reduction in 4 from 4 = q leads to an increase in the
output of each of the N-S unconstrained firms. Upon substituting
from (8) and using the fact that A < 0 and p'- C" < 0, condition
(7) may now be rewritten:
-tr s 0 iff S - a(N-S) 1 (9)
q Kg= 5
where:
x (4,N,S) - +' " (10)
In the case where a = i (for example when C" =p" =0)
condition (9) says that the firms in the subset will strictly
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gain from an exogenously-induced marginal contraction (expansion)
of their output if and only if they outnumber the firms outside
the subset by more than one (less than one). Refer to the term
a(N-S) as the "adjusted" number of firms outside the subset.
Then, more generally, a marginal output contraction (expansion) is
profitable for the firms in the subset if and only if they exceed
the adjusted number of firms outside the subset by more than one
(less than one).
It is clear by inspection of (10) that if marginal cost is
constant (C" = 0), we have a = 1 when the inverse demand curve is
linear, a C 1 when it is strictly convex and a > 1 when it is
strictly concave. More generally, with nondecreasing marginal
cost (C" 0), convexity of the inverse demand curve is sufficient
(but not necessary) for a . 1. It is sufficient (but not
necessary) for a < 1 if marginal cost is strictly increasing
(C" > 0). Concavity of the inverse demand curve is necessary (but
not sufficient) for a 1.
The curvatures of the cost and demand functions thus
affect the magnitude of a and hence the comparative static results
on us. In particular, if a . 1 and the number of firms in the
subset exceeds the actual (and hence the adjusted) number of
outside firms by more than one, then aus/aq < 0 at q = q. If
instead cc > 1 and the number of firms in the subset exceeds the
actual (and hence the adjusted) number of firms outside it by
less than one, then av/a > 0.
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Notice that as monopoly theory would lead one to expect,
regardless of the curvatures of costs and demand curves, a
monopolist always wants to reduce aggregate output below the
level at which its multiple plants would operate in an uncon-
strained Cournot equilibrium. That is, since a > 0, if S = N 2,
then ans/a4 < 0 at 4q= q.
If, at the other extreme S = 1 and N 1 2, then the result
is reversed: ars/34 > 0 at 4 = q and an exogenous expansion of its
output increases the profit of the designated firm. The intuition
behind this latter result is that, when S = 1, an expansion in q
must induce a decrease in the aggregate output of the N-1 other
firms and this will be profitable to the expanding firm. When
S > 1, the argument is of course invalid: the direction of change
of the aggregate output of the N-1 other firms is ambiguous since
S-1 of them are also increasing their output. A marginal expansion
in q may then be unprofitable to the firms in the subset.
This last implication of condition (9) is often unappre-
ciated and merits emphasis. Conventional comparisons of Cournot
and Stackelberg equilibria, for example, assume that the Stackel-
berg player controls a single technology. Similarly, games where
a government policy in the first stage alters the payoff functions
of a subset of noncooperative players in the second stage often
assume that the subset contains a single firm. Such analyses in
effect assume S = 1. This assumption may seem convenient since it
permits the use of two-dimensional reaction-function diagrams.
Moreover, the analyses may appear general since, when S =1, the
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results hold for a wide class of cost and demand functions. But,
as will become evident in the next subsection and beyond, such
analyses are misleading, since their results can be reversed when
S > 1.
The same comparative-static analysis applied to the
situation where firms are price-takers rather than Cournot
competitors will show that it could also be misleading to infer
results for the price-taking equilibrium from those of the Cournot
equilibrium. It is already clear from (9) that for the Cournot
equilibrium, given the number of firms in the industry, the firms
in the subset will gain from an exogenously-induced marginal
output contraction if their number is large enough and will lose
if their number is small enough. This is not the case in the
price-taking equilibrium, where the constrained firms never lose
from an exogenously-induced marginal output contraction.
The solution to the price-taking equilibrium will satisfy:
p - C' (q) = 0 (2')
p - C'(q) = p (3')
as well as (4). Equations (2') and (3') have the same interpre-
tation as (2) and (3), except for the assumption of price-taking
behavior on the part of the firms. The equilibrium profits of the
typical constrained firm may still be written as in (5), except
that q = q(q,N,S) is now the price-taking equilibrium output
obtained from the solution to (2'), (3') and (4).
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The derivative of equilibrium profits of the constrained
firm with respect to q can be written as:
a p+  + (11)
aq u aq
The first term is zero when q = q, at the unconstrained price-
taking equilibrium. It captures the (negligible) effect of the
marginal contraction in output on the profits of the constrained
firm if price did not change. The second term captures the
effect attributable to the equilibrium price change, as a
consequence of the net change in aggregate output. Unless
marginal cost is constant, in which case aggregate output and
price remain unchanged, aggregate output will decrease and price
will increase as a result of the marginal output contraction by
the firms in the subset. Thus, after substituting for the value
of ap/aq (see Appendix A), we may write:
a 8 = Sp'-C"[1 - (S)p - C) i 0 (12)
The constrained firms therefore never lose from an exogenous
marginal contraction of output in a price-taking equilibrium and
never gain from a marginal expansion. Indeed, if marginal cost is
strictly increasing and the number of firms is finite, they always
gain from a marginal contraction and always lose from a marginal
expansion. When marginal cost is constant, the marginal gain (or
loss) is zero. 7
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B. Non-Marginal Changes
We have so far restricted our attention to the effect on
the profit of a subset S of constrained firms of a marginal
contraction of their outputs in the neighborhood of the uncon-
strained equilibrium. The analysis can now be extended to the
case of non-marginal contractions of their outputs. We will
assume henceforth that the equilibrium profit of the S firms in
the subset, nrs(q,N,S) (see equation 5), is a single-peaked
function of q.A
Consider first the case of Cournot oligopoly. Our results
imply that a marginal contraction is strictly beneficial to each
firm in the subset if their number exceeds the (adjusted) number
of firms outside it by more than one (i.e., S - a(N-S) > 1).
Under the same circumstances, a non-marginal contraction will also
be beneficial as long as the output of each constrained firm is
not forced below a critical level, y < q*, defined by:
p(Sy + (M-S)q(r))y - C(r) = p*qt - C(q*) (13)
where p* and q* are the price and outputs in the unconstrained
Cournot equilibrium and q(y) is defined implicitly, for given N
and S, by p(Sy + (N-S)q) + qp'(Sy * (N-S)q) = C'(q). If, on the
other hand, the number of firms in the subset exceeds the
(adjusted) number of outside firms by less than one (i.e.,
S - ax(N-S) ( 1), then any reduction in output, either marginal or
non-marginal, will be harmful to the constrained firms. Finally,
if the number of firms in the subset happens to exceed the
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(adjusted) number of firms outside it by exactly one (i.e.,
S - (N-S) = 1), a marginal contraction in the neighborhood of the
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium has no effect on the profit of
the constrained firm but any non-marginal contraction is unprofi-
table.
The panels of Figure 1 illustrate each of these situa-
tions. In each panel, the equilibrium profit of the typical firm
in the subset is plotted as a function of their exogenous output
constraint (4). Output level (K would maximize the profits of
each firm in the subset given that the outside firms best-reply.
Points C', C 2  and C3  correspond to the unconstrained Cournot
equilibrium in each of the alternative situations just described.
[Figure 1 goes here]
Panel A illustrates the first case, where the number of
firms in the subset exceeds the (adjusted) number of outside firms
by more than one. As a result, from (9), the slope of us with
respect to q is negative at C1 and jK must be smaller than q*.
It follows that an exogenous contraction to any level of output in
the interval (y,q*) would be beneficial. Panel B illustrates the
second case. The inequality in (9) is now reversed and therefore
the slope of r3 is positive at Cz. Since 4 K must then be greater
than q*, any contraction in the output of the constrained firms
reduces their profits. The third situation, in which N and S are
such that 4K = qgg silsrte npnlC Ceryaynn
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marginal contraction is then unprofitable to the S firms in the
subset.
These results have implications for the relationship of
Cournot to Stackelberg equilibrium. By Stackelberg equilibrium,
we refer here to the situation where a leader controls the S firms
in the subset and determines their outputs in order to maximize
his joint profits, assuming that the N-S firms outside the subset
will best reply. It is shown in Appendix C that for all N and S
such that (7) (and hence (9)) holds with equality, the vector of
price and outputs in the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium
coincides with the vector of price and outputs in the Stackelberg
equilibrium. With us a single-peaked function of c, this
Stackelberg equilibrium is unique. Thus, a marginal reduction in
q at the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium will move the output of
the firms in the subset toward the Stackelberg output if
aus/aq < 0 at the equilibrium and away from it if bus/aq ) 0.
Clearly, the Stackelberg leader who gained control of the S
technologies would always set their outputs at 4K.9 Since:
q_ q* iff S - x(N-S) 1 (14)
the relationship of the leader's output under Stackelberg and
Cournot equilibrium has been characterized precisely. The
conventional result that the Stackelberg leader produces more than
in the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium (i.e., 4K > q*) is true
if S = 1 (and N 1 2) but not in general.
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These results in turn have implications for the literature
on "first-mover advantage". There are two distinct definitions of
first-mover advantage in the literature. Under a first definition
(see Shapiro, 1987, p. 67-68), a Stackelberg leader is said to
have an advantage if his profits are strictly larger than they
would be in a Cournot equilibrium. If we apply this definition, a
Stackelberg leader has a first-mover advantage if and only if
S - a(N-S) - 1; he has none when S - a(N-S) = 1.
Dowrick (1986) and Gal-Or (1985), among others, have
investigated the advantage which a Stackelberg leader has over the
follower in a Stackelberg duopoly game. This leads to a second
and distinct definition of first-mover advantage: a Stackelberg
leader is said to have an advantage if his profit is larger than
the profit of the follower in the Stackelberg equilibrium. A
natural generalization of this definition to the case where the
subset moving first (or second) contains several firms is to
replace "profit" by "profit per firm in the subset". Under this
definition, a Stackelberg leader will have a first-mover advantage
if and only if S - a(N-S) < 1, since in that circumstance he will
choose to expand output relative to the unconstrained Cournot
output (jK > q*) and that will depress profit per firm of the
followers. When S - x(N-S) > 1, the Stackelberg leader will
contract output (4K < q*). Since his profit per firm then rises
less than profit per firm of the followers (see Appendix B), the
leader would have a first-mover disadvantage.
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Notice that under either of those two definitions, with
a > 0 the leader always has a first-mover advantage in the special
case of a duopoly and indeed anytime S = 1 and N 2, since that
insures S - a(N-S) > 1.
We conclude this section by considering the effects of
non-marginal output contractions if the firms are price-takers.
If all firms have constant marginal costs (C" = 0), each then
earns zero profits. As long as there is any firm outside the
designated subset (S < N), neither a marginal nor a non-marginal
contraction will have any effect on profits. On the other hand,
in the more interesting case where marginal cost is strictly
increasing (C" > 0), a marginal contraction of q will always
strictly increase the profit of the S firms. Assuming 1s is a
single-peaked function of q, this implies that the maximum of us
always occurs at a smaller q than that associated with the uncon-
strained price-taking equilibrium. Any contraction therefore
strictly benefits each constrained firm as long as its output is
not forced below a critical level. This critical level is defined
as in (13), with pt and q* reinterpreted as the unconstrained
price-taking equilibrium price and outputs and q(y) redefined
implicitly by p(Sy + (N-S)q) = C'(q).
Again the results have implications for the relationship
of the unconstrained equilibrium to the Stackelberg equilibrium
(see Appendix C). Since the price-taking equilibrium level of
output is never lower than the level of 4 which maximizes usr, a
Stackelberg leader who gained control of S firms previously in a
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price-taking equilibrium and anticipated that the remaining N-S
firms would continue to be price-takers would never want to expand
output of the S firms. He would maintain the price-taking
equilibrium output level if marginal cost were constant and would
contract the common output of the S firms under his control (or,
equivalently, raise the price) if marginal costs were strictly
increasing. Finally, if we adapt the two definitions of first-
mover advantage to the case where the followers are price-takers,
we get the following implications (for the case where C" > 0):
under the first definition, the leader has a first-mover advantage
since his profits increase relative to the unconstrained price-
taking equilibrium; however, under the second definition, the
leader always has a first-mover disadvantage since his profit per




The comparative-static results we have been investigating
have many applications. Consider first the effect of a labor
strike on the profits of the struck firms. It is often taken for
granted that a struck firm must be harmed by the forced reduction
in its output. However, our analysis delineates circumstances in
which, under either an oligopolistic or a competitive market
structure, each targeted firm will in fact benefit from a
strike.' 0 The 1979 lettuce strike against selected producers in
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the Imperial Valley of California appears to have illustrated this
perverse result. 11
In the case of Cournot oligopoly, our results imply that a
marginal strike is strictly beneficial to each struck firm if and
only if the number of struck firms exceeds the (adjusted) number
of nonstruck firms by more than one. Under the same circumstan-
ces, a non-marginal strike will also be beneficial as long as the
output of each struck firm is not forced below the critical level,
y < q*, defined in (13).
In the price-taking equilibrium case, a marginal strike is
strictly beneficial if firms have strictly convex costs and has no
effect if firms have linear costs. These results again extend if
we consider the case of a non-marginal strike. With linear costs,
no reduction in the output of a struck firm affects its profits
(as long as there exists some firm in the industry which is not
struck). With strictly convex costs, each struck firm will
strictly benefit from a non-marginal strike as long as its output
is not forced below the appropriate critical level defined in the
previous section.
B. Export Taxes and Subsidies
A rationale for subsidizing the exports of domestic firms
has recently been proposed by Brander and Spencer (1985). They
consider a model where Cournot duopolists, one in each country,
export to consumers in a third country. They show that imposition
of a marginal subsidy, in the neighborhood of free trade equili-
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brium, will always increase the profit of the domestic firm net
of the subsidy.12 These results rely again on the comparative-
static properties of the Cournot model derived in section II.
Our analysis makes clear that the Brander-Spencer result is a
special case: regardless of the curvatures of the cost and demand
curves, if there is only one firm in the subset and one or more
firms outside the subset, then a marginal expansion of the output
of the firm in the subset in the neighborhood of Cournot equili-
brium must increase its profits. This clearly-follows from (9).
In an N-firm oligopoly, the domestic attractiveness of the subsidy
will depend, given N, on the number of domestic firms.1 3 In fact,
the optimal policy may instead be a tax.14
Consider an industry composed of N identical firms.
Partition it into S domestic firms and N-S foreign firms. Let t
denote the per-unit tax (if positive) or subsidy (if negative) of
the domestic firms and let qa denote their individual output. The
first-order condition of the typical domestic firm is then:
p + p'qa - C'(qd) = t (15)
If condition (3) is now replaced by (15), the new system of
equations defines the values of (p,q,qd) in the Cournot equili-
brium with export tax t; q now denotes the typical foreign firm's
output.
Now by the implicit function theorem, there exists in the
original problem a function pj(4,N,S) which solves (2), (3) and (4)
and whose derivative a/aq can be evaluated by Cramer's rule (see
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Appendix A). Set t = p(4,N,S) and it is clear that for any
exogenous t, there is an endogenous qa (set equal to 4), which
will exactly duplicate the equilibrium obtained with 4 as an
exogenous parameter and p as an endogenous variable. Note that:
p(4,N,S) = t 0 for q= q (16)
Moreover, since aqa/at = 1/(ap/a4), the comparative-static proper-
ties of the Cournot equilibrium with respect to 4 derived in
section II can be used to analyze the effects of changes in t. We
simply have to treat an increase (decrease) in t as a decrease
(increase) in 4.
Note also that the after-tax equilibrium profit of the
domestic firm is now us(qd,N,S) - tqd, where iru(qa,N,S), given by
(5), is the equilibrium profit before payment to the government.
It is assumed that the per-firm tax revenue, tqd, is redistributed
in a lump-sum. Thus an increase in vs means a net welfare gain
for the domestic country and whatever trade policy induces this
gain is advantageous.
The results of section II for a contraction of output
apply directly to the case of the export tax (t > 0) or subsidy
(t < 0). Thus, if the number of domestic firms exceeds the
(adjusted) number of foreign firms by more than one, a marginal
increase of the export tax from t = 0 will cause an increase in
us, which equals the sum of the domestic firms' after-tax equili-
brium profits and the rebated tax revenues. In such a case, the
initial Cournot equilibrium is a point such as C1 in panel A of
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Figure 1. The equilibrium profit function is negatively sloped
with respect to q at C1 (positively sloped with respect to t) and
the equilibrium level of output exceeds the joint Stackelberg
level. A tax therefore exogenously supports a move toward the
joint Stackelberg level of output by the domestic firms and is
therefore attractive from this point of view. An export subsidy
in such circumstances would, of course, adversely affect the home
country.
If instead the number of domestic firms exceeds the
(adjusted) number of foreign firms by less than one, a marginal
increase of the export tax from t = 0 would cause a reduction in
Ts. The initial equilibrium is then a point such as C2 in panel
B, where q* < qc, and the optimal trade policy for the home
country is an export subsidy. Such circumstances inevitably arise
when the domestic sector consists of a single firm (S = 1,
N 2).1s
Consider finally a price-taking equilibrium. Since the
price-taking equilibrium output of the domestic firms is never
lower than the relevant Stackelberg output, an export subsidy will
never be an attractive policy from the domestic point of view.
But, if costs are strictly convex, a tax always will be.
C. Horizontal Mergers
As a final application, suppose the S firms in the subset
now represent firms which are part of a merger or, equivalently,
members of a cartel (with perfect enforcement). In general,
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merging or cartelizing will cause price to rise, aggregate output
to fall, the outputs and profits of the (N-S) outside firms to
rise, and the outputs of the merged entity to fall. Salant et al.
(1983) and others have pointed out, however, that the profits of
the merged entity (or cartel) may fall. A merger would of course
increase profits if output of the N-S outside firms remained
unchanged. But their output will not remain unchanged; it will
increase. As a result of outsider expansion, merging or carteli-
zing some subsets of firms exogenously may be disadvantageous; if
the merger decision were endogenized, such mergers would presuma-
bly not occur.
This "losses from merger" result is yet another conse-
quence of properties of the Cournot model investigated in section
II. The pre-merger equilibrium is simply the "unconstrained
Cournot equilibrium" of that section. Price and outputs in the
post-merger equilibrium are determined by the following three
equations:
p + qp' - C'(q) = 0 (17)
p + Sqap' - C'(q.) = 0 (18)
p = p(Sq, + (N-S)q) (19)
where qM denotes the output of each technology operated by the
merged entity and q denotes the output of the (N-S) outsiders.
As (18) reflects, each technology in the merged entity is
operated for the joint profit of the entity. It will be easier to
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compare this set of equations to (2)-(4) if we rewrite (18) as
follows:
p + qmp' - C' (q.) = -(S-1)qap' (18')
Suppose we solve this new set of equations for p ,q ,and qm. If we
now set q = qn, then (2)-(4) will reproduce the merger equili-
brium. That is, the endogenous variables (p, q, p) will equal
(p, q, -(S-1)qp'). Hence, any merger equilibrium can be regarded
as a special case of (2)-(4) for a particular setting of the
constraint (q).
Since the merger equilibrium is a special case, the
results of section II can be applied. Whenever the number of
firms in a merger exceeds the (adjusted) number of outside firms
by less than one, a merger will cause a loss, as is illustrated in
panel B of Figure 1. Since the Cournot output is smaller than the
Stackelberg output in this case, the merger reduces output even
further below the Stackelberg point and profits fall. Whenever
the number of firms in a merger exceeds the (adjusted) number of
outside firms by more than one, a marginal contraction of output
is profitable. But a merger results in a non-marginal contraction
in output and this may or may not be profitable. This case is
illustrated in panel A of Figure 1. If q. < r the merger will
cause a loss.' 6 if, on the other hand, Y < q. ( q*, the merger
will cause a gain.
The merger equilibrium can also be regarded as a special
case of the equilibrium with export taxes. If we set
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t = -(S-1)qmp', the endogenous variables in the export-tax equili-
brium will equal those in the merger equilibrium. Thus, for any
merger equilibrium, there is a tax rate which will generate the
same outputs and price. Profits of the taxed firms will coincide
with those of the merged firm provided the tax revenues are
returned to the firms in a lump sum. Alternatively, if the tax
revenues are not returned, profits to the taxed firms plus
government receipts from the export tax will equal profits of the
merged firm.
To emphasize the relationship of the seemingly dissimilar
literatures on export subsidies and on horizontal mergers, we
state the following propositions:
1) Whenever an export subsidy would increase the profits of the
home country, merging the entire export sector must cause a loss.
2) Whenever merging the entire export sector would cause a gain,
an export subsidy must reduce the profits of the home country.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed a property of the Cournot
model which underlies several important but seemingly disparate
results. We have proved that a marginal output reduction by each
of a subset of S firms in an industry is beneficial to them if S
is sufficiently large relative to N-S and harmful if S is
sufficiently small.
To this point, our analysis has been predicated on the
assumption that firms 1)compete in quantity, 2)produce strategic
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substitutes (reaction functions slope downward) and 3)sell them
to consumers who regard the goods as substitutes in demand. Since
each of these three assumptions could have been specified in
either of two different ways, there are in fact eight cases in
all, seven of which have so far received no consideration. In
this final section, we wish to comment informally on the implica-
tions of our analysis for these other cases. A more formal
generalization is relegated to Appendix D.
We can dispel at the outset the notion that our results
apply only to quantity competition. Sonnenschein (1968) has
pointed out a result implicit in Cournot (1838): the situation
where firms sell perfect substitutes and compete in quantities is
dual to the case where firms sell perfect complements and compete
in prices. Any result in one model can be reinterpreted as a
result in the other. Consider then an industry of N firms with
identical costs, each selling inputs which are perfect
complements. Competition is in prices. We again impose the
condition that the goods are strategic substitutes (the reaction
functions in price space slope downward). Suppose a subset of S
firms are forced to reduce their prices marginally, as would
result if they were subject to a price ceiling. Our results in
section II and duality then jointly imply that the subset of firms
would benefit if S is sufficiently close to N. Indeed, the
precise conditions we derived still hold, with the roles of
quantities and prices interchanged. It also follows that if S is
sufficiently small, a price ceiling imposed on the S firms would
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reduce their profits, as would a horizontal merger. Therefore,
in contrast to the case of strategic complements in Davidson and
Deneckere (1985), losses from horizontal mergers can occur when
price is the strategic variable if goods are strategic
substitutes.
More generally, whenever the goods are strategic substi-
tutes, an exogenous marginal decrease in the strategic variables
of a subset of S firms in a symmetric equilibrium will induce a
marginal increase in the strategic variables of the remaining N-S
firms. Viewed from the perspective of a single firm in the
subset, the Marginal change in its own variable has negligible
effect and the changes in the other N-I variables go in conflict-
ing directions: S-1 of the variables decrease and N-S of them
increase. The net effect will then depend on the size of the two
subsets.17 Whenever we have strategic substitutes, results which
depend on the sizes of the two subsets will appear.
On the other hand, whenever the goods are strategic
complements, an exogenous marginal decrease in the strategic
variables of a subset of S firms in a symetric equilibrium will
induce a reinforcing marginal decrease in the strategic variables
of the remaining N-S firms. Viewed from the perspective of a
single firm in the subset, the Marginal change in its own variable
has negligible effect, but since all of the other N-i changes are
in the same rather than in offsetting directions, the comparative-
static results will not depend at all on the relative size of S.
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To illustrate, if quantity (price) is the strategic
variable and the goods are substitutes in demand then a marginal
contraction in the strategic variable will always increase
(decrease) profits of each firm in the subset in the case of
strategic complements; in the case of strategic substitutes, the
same results will hold if S is sufficiently close to N and the
reverse results will hold otherwise. Similarly, if quantity
(price) is the strategic variable and the goods are complements in
demand then a marginal contraction in the strategic variable will
always decrease (increase) profits of each firm in the subset in
the case of strategic complements; in the case of strategic
substitutes, the same results will hold if S is sufficiently close
to N and the reverse results will hold otherwise.
28
FOOTNOTES
1. This assumption is equivalent to p'(Q) + Qp"(Q) < 0 for all
Q i. Q (see Shapiro, 1987). Although not necessary for
existence, it does guarantee that a Cournot equilibrium exists
in the case of homogeneous goods under weaker requirements on
cost functions than those we assume (see Movshek, 1985 or
Fraysse. 1986). Under our assumptions on costs and demand, it
in fact is sufficient for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium
(see Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1987).
The assumption of convex costs could be relaxed and the
results derived in this section extended to a wider class of
cost functions. If marginal costs were decreasing, our
results would continue to hold as long as C" > p'.
2. See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) for a general
definition of strategic substitutes and complements. We
discuss briefly the implications of our analysis for strategic
complements (upward sloping reaction functions) in the
concluding section.
3. The possibility clearly exists that 4 is large enough that
each of the firms outside the constrained subset chooses to
produce zero output; that is, for some values of 4, there is
no positive value of q which satisfies (2). We will ignore
this case here, by restricting our attention to situations
where (2), (3) and (4) yield an interior solution for q.
Since we have assumed zero fixed cost, this also means that no
firm will earn negative profits in equilibrium.
4. If 4 < q, then p > 0. Unless explicitly stated otherwise,
this is the case we have in mind in most of section II.
However, one can obviously think of important cases where
4 > q, and as result p < 0. One such case is the export
subsidy problem, which we discuss in section III. It will
become clear further on that the results for 4 C q will
always carry through for 4 > q if we simply interchange
everywhere the words gain and lose.
5. This is simply an application of the envelope theorem to each
of the S firms in the subset.
6. We show in Appendix B that the firms outside the subset always
gain (lose) from a marginal contraction (expansion) of the
outputs of the firms in the subset. Furthermore, when the
firms in the constrained subset gain from a contraction of
their output, those outside always gain more and when they
lose from an expansion, those outside always lose more.
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7. It also approaches zero with increasing marginal cost as the
number of firms approaches infinity. This is also the case in
Cournot equilibrium, as may be verified from equation (6). At
the limit, as N tends to infinity, equations (2) and (3)
coincide with (2') and (3') and the Cournot equilibrium
coincides with the price-taking competitive equilibrium.
However, it is noteworthy that, for any given S, ars/aq is
positive for a sufficiently large finite N in Cournot
equilibrium (condition 9), whereas it is negative in the
competitive price-taking equilibrium (or zero with marginal
cost constant). It therefore goes to zero from positive
values in Cournot equilibrium and from negative values in
price-taking equilibrium and the qualitative comparative
static results of the two models coincide only in the limit,
as N goes to infinity in both models.
8. It is easily verified that one situation among others where
this assumption is satisfied is when marginal cost is constant
and inverse demand is linear.
9. Since cost functions are convex and identical, the leader
would have no incentive to operate two technologies differen-
tly.
10. A strike might not only reduce output but might in addition
increase the cost of producing that reduced output. We ignore
this additional effect but note that, even in its presence,
each targeted firm might still benefit from the strike.
11. See Carter et al. (1981) for an empirical analysis of the
effects of this strike.
12. Eaton and Grossman (1986) also consider Bertrand competition
in their analysis of optimal trade policy under oligopoly.
They show that whether the duopolists compete in price or
quantity, an export tax (rather than subsidy) is optimal if
the goods are strategic complements (upward sloping reaction
functions) but not complements in demand. The export subsidy
is optimal if the goods are strategic substitutes. The
intuition behind this result will become clear in the next
section, when we discuss extensions of our analysis to price
competition, strategic complementarity and demand complemen-
tarity.
13. On this point, see also Dixit (1984) and Salant (1984).
Referring to these papers, Brander and Spencer acknowledge
that "adding more domestic firms weakens the case for domestic
subsidies" (footnote 6, page 85). Indeed, it can easily
destroy the case.
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14. An optimal subsidy means here one that realizes the Stackel-
berg output for the domestic sector, since by assumption
there is no domestic consumption of the good.
15. The literature on two-stage games (e.g. Dixit (1980)) also
typically assumes that there exists a single incumbent whose
prior positioning (expanded capacity, etc.) is designed to
affect the subsequent simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium. If
instead there were multiple incumbents supported by some form
of prior government policy or otherwise, the opposite results
(e.g. diminished capacity) could ocatr.
16. A particularly striking example has' been worked out by Zachau
(1987). With quadratic costs and proportional demand
(p = v/Q), for any N and any 1 < S < N, a merger causes a
loss; the only merger which is profitable is merger to
monopoly. In this example, whenever a marginal contraction
would be profitable, the merger results in a non-marginal
contraction which is so large that q. ( y and a loss results.
17. In the extreme case of monopoly (S = N), all of the variables




The Comparative Statics of the Equilibrium Systems
The Cournot equilibrium conditions (2), (3) and (4) and
the price-taking equilibrium conditions (2'), (3') and (4) are
systems of equations in p, q and p with q, N, S as parameters.
The Jacobian of the system is A = (N-S)[p'+ qp"] + p'- C" < 0 for
the Cournot equilibrium and D = (N-S)p'- C" < 0 for the price-
taking equilibrium, since p' < 0, p'+ qp" < 0 and C" 0. The
Jacobian being nonvanishing in both cases, there exists, by the
implicit function theorem, functions p(,N,S), q(q,N,S) and
p(q,N,S) which solve each system and whose derivatives with
respect to the parameters may be obtained by applying Cramer's
rule. In particular, for the Cournot equilibrium, the deriva-
tives with respect to 4 are given by:
( [PlIp' C"]Sp' < 0 (Al)
0AA1
-<-[p'+ p"JS 0(A2)
1 + S[p'+ p")] p'- C"] < 0 (A3)LA 
A
For the price-taking equilibrium, the same derivatives with




- 1 + ]C" . 0 (A6)
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APPENDIX B
The Effect on the Profits of the Firms Outside the Subset
The profit of the typical firm outside the subset is:
nr(q,N,S) = p(Sq + (N-S)q)q - C(q) (B1)
where q(4,M,S) is obtained from the solution to (2), (3) and (4)
in the case of the Cournot equilibrium or (2'), (3') and (4) in
the case of the price-taking equilibrium. In the case of the
Cournot equilibrium, we verify, after making use of the envelope
theorem and substituting for aq/a from (A2), that:
pqp" - C" < 0 (B2)
Therefore, independently of N, S and 4, a marginal contraction of
the outputs of a subset of the firms (S > 0) increases the profit
of each of the firms outside the subset. This is because they end
up producing more at a higher price (see Appendix A) and a greater
spread between price and marginal cost, since p'+ qp" < 0. It can
also be shown that they will always gain more than the firms in
the subset. This is obvious if the firms in the subset lose. But
suppose they gain and consider the following thought experiment.
Take a firm inside the subset and expand its output until it is as
large as the typical firm outside the subset. Simultaneously,
take a firm outside the subset and contract its output until it
produces as little as the typical firm within the subset. At no
point would any other firm wish to deviate from its equilibrium
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output. Moreover, the price would remain at
level. Clearly, this interchange will not be in
the firm outside the subset. Since it is already
price greater than marginal cost, any reduction in










which is clearly positive when p - C'(q) is positive and q < q.
Notice that if j > q the loss becomes a gain, i.e. if the firms in
the subset lose from a marginal expansion of output, the outsiders
lose even more. It is clear from (B2) that the firms outside the
subset always lose from a marginal expansion of the outputs of the
firms in the subset.
The equivalent to (B2) in the price-taking equilibrium
is, after substituting for aq/a4 from (A5):
a1 " - -Sp'qC" i 0i
a4 (N-S)p' - C"
(B3)
With constant marginal costs, there is no effect on the profits of
the firms outside the subset from either a marginal contraction or
expansion of the outputs of the firms in the subset. But with
strictly increasing marginal costs, the same results as for the
Cournot equilibrium carry through, by similar reasoning.
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APPENDIX C
The Stackelberg Levels of Output
In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the output of each of the
S firms controlled by the leader solves:
Max [p(s4+(N-s)q)sq - SC(4)] (Cl)
subject to q satisfying equation (2) when the M-S followers are
Cournot players or equation (2') when they are price-takers. The
first-order condition to problem (Cl), with S given, may be
written:
[p p' q - C'(q)]s + [(S-1) + (N-S)A]p'qS = 0 (C2)
Assume first a Cournot fringe. If N and S are such that condition
(7), with aq/aj given by (A2), is satisfied with equality, the
second term vanishes and condition (C2) reduces to
p + p'q - C'(q) = 0. This is exactly the first-order condition at
an unconstrained Cournot equilibrium (i.e., q = q and y = 0). For
those combinations of N and S, the Stackelberg leader facing
Cournot followers would therefore choose to operate the S firms
under his control exactly as they would have been at an uncon-
strained Cournot equilibrium.
Now assume a fringe of price-takers. If N and S are such
that condition (12) is satisfied with equality, then
[S + (N-SYaq/84] = 0, where now aq/ad is given by (A5). The
second term of (C2) therefore reduces to -p'4S and condition (C2)
reduces to p - C' (4) = 0. This is exactly the first-order
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condition at an unconstrained price-taking equilibrium. For those
combinations of N and S, the Stackelberg leader facing a price-
taking fringe would therefore choose to operate the S firms under




Generalization of the comparative statics result on profits
Consider a symmetric game where each of N players simulta-
neously selects a scalar strategy, a,, i = 1,N, and payoffs are
collected. The payoff of player i, i = 1,N, is given by:
(Dl)
We assume Ti is twice continuously differentiable. We also assume
that there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and
that it is symmetric. Denote it a; = a, i = 1,N.
A subset of S players is exogenously imposed the cons-
traint aj = a. Without loss of generality we may assign the sub-
scripts 1,2,...,S to these players. The initial equilibrium will
be displaced if and only if a y a. We refer to the situation
where a = a as the unconstrained equilibrium. Given N and S, at
the new equilibrium we will have a,(a), i = S+1,N, as an implicit
soLution to the first-order condition of the N-S players outside
the subset.
The effect of a marginal change in i on the equilibrium
profit of the typical firm in the subset (i = 1,S) is given by:
s N




When das/d5 is positive (respectively, negative), we have
"strategic complements" (respectively, strategic substitutes). We
consider the case where at the unconstrained equilibrium ani/aaj
has the same sign for all j - i, i = 1,S and da;/d5 has the same
sign for all j = S+1,N.
When evaluated at the unconstrained equilibrium,
aui/aai = 0 for all i=1,N. Hence, for strategic complements,
(D2) implies sgn(du'/da) = sgn(ani/aa;) in the neighborhood of the
unconstrained equilibrium, independently of N and S. On the other
hand, for strategic substitutes, sgn(dni/da) clearly depends on
(N,S). For example, when S = 1, the first summation is zero and
sgn(dus/da) = - sgn(ani/aaj). When N = S, the second summation is
zero and sgn(dui/da) = sgn(aui/aa).
These results are general. They include price and
quantity competition as important special cases. Hence
ant/8a; < 0 arises in quantity competition if the goods are
substitutes in demand and in price competition if the goods are
complements in demand. ani/aa; > 0 arises in quantity competition
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